
An ETF Is a Product, Not a Strategy
Why the Next Dollar Deserves a Decision
September 18, 2026
Market data and forecasts are dated individually throughout the paper.
Executive Summary
“Just buy the index.”
For a lot of people, that is pretty good advice.
Low-cost index funds have made diversification inexpensive and accessible. They can reduce the pressure to pick individual stocks and trade frequently, can be tax-efficient, and decades of research have shown just how difficult it is for professional active managers to outperform suitable benchmarks after fees.[1]
So this paper is not an argument against index funds.
It is an argument against confusing the product with the entire strategy.
An exchange-traded fund can tell you what you own. It cannot tell you why you own it, how much of your wealth belongs there, when you may need the money, how much liquidity you should maintain, what taxes matter, whether you already have too much exposure to one company or industry, or what return you actually need.
Those are capital-allocation decisions.
And they lead to a question I believe investors should ask more often:
What should my next dollar do?
Sometimes the answer may be the S&P 500. Sometimes it may be another diversified investment, an individual business, a Treasury security, cash, paying down debt, diversifying a concentrated position, or preserving liquidity for a known future need.
The point is not that investors should constantly reconsider every dollar. Quite the opposite. A good policy should prevent us from changing course simply because markets moved, someone else made more money, or a headline made us nervous.
If you have already defined the purpose of the money, selected an appropriate allocation, and automated the implementation, that automation is not thoughtless. It is the execution of a decision made in advance.
The question is whether the policy still fits the investor’s life.
Indexing solves much of the security-selection problem. It does not eliminate the capital-allocation problem.
1. When Good Advice Becomes a Rule
Some financial advice becomes popular because it deserves to.
Spend less than you earn. Diversify. Keep costs low. Don’t panic when markets fall. Don’t trade constantly.
And for many investors:
Buy low-cost index funds and keep investing.
There is a lot of wisdom packed into that sentence.
The problem begins when a good default becomes an unquestioned answer to every situation.
If you have $1,000 available this month, should it go into exactly the same investment you bought last month?
Maybe.
But the answer should come from the policy, not from the mere fact that the cash exists.
That does not mean every paycheck deserves a fresh market opinion. If an investor has already established a suitable long-term allocation and an automatic contribution plan, continuing to follow that plan can be one of the most disciplined decisions available.
The question is whether having money available is, by itself, enough reason to buy something.
I don’t think it is.
Capital should have a job. That job may be long-term growth, retirement income, liquidity, debt reduction, a near-term purchase, diversification away from an existing concentration, or simply executing an investment policy that has already been thoughtfully designed.
And sometimes, after going through that exercise, the conclusion will be:
Keep buying the index exactly as planned.
That’s a perfectly acceptable answer.
The distinction is not between “thinking” and “automation.” It is between having a policy and having none.
2. What Are We Actually Trying to Accomplish?
The investment industry loves benchmarks.
Did you beat the S&P 500?
Did you underperform it?
What did the Dow do?
What did your portfolio do compared with everyone else’s?
Those are useful questions when we’re evaluating investment performance.
But they aren’t necessarily the reason you’re investing.
Suppose you outperform the S&P 500 but fail to fund your retirement.
Did you win?
Suppose you underperform it but retire when you want, spend what you want, help your children, sleep well during bear markets, minimize unnecessary taxes, and never run out of money.
Did you lose?
That’s why I like to say:
The benchmark isn’t the goal. Your life is the benchmark.
That doesn’t mean benchmarks don’t matter.
If someone charges you substantially more for a strategy that consistently produces worse results than a suitable low-cost alternative without providing some other meaningful benefit, saying “your life is the benchmark” shouldn’t excuse it.
A financial strategy still needs accountability.
But we should first define what success actually means.
For one person, maximizing long-term growth may be perfectly rational.
For another, the extra return may have very little effect on their life while the additional risk could have a large one.
The investment portfolio is supposed to serve the financial plan.
Not the other way around.
3. An ETF Is a Product
Imagine two investors each own the exact same S&P 500 ETF.
Investor A is 32 years old, has stable income, a six-month emergency reserve, no major debt, decades before retirement, and invests automatically every month.
Investor B is 67, recently retired, owns a large amount of employer stock, expects to begin portfolio withdrawals, and has significant embedded capital gains.
Same ETF.
Very different financial situations.
That’s the distinction.
An ETF can provide diversification, exposure, liquidity, low costs, and simplicity. It can also be used to implement a very thoughtful investment strategy.
But owning the ETF does not, by itself, answer how much either investor should hold, what they will need next year, what their tax situation looks like, what risks already exist elsewhere on the balance sheet, or whether a 40% market decline would be an inconvenience or a life-changing event.
Those are strategy questions.
And the same limitation applies to individual stocks, bonds, cash, and real estate. Every investment is a tool. The financial plan determines the job.
Choosing an investment product is one decision inside a financial strategy. It is not the entire strategy.

Hypothetical examples for illustration only.
And this is why I think the distinction matters:
An ETF is a product. Capital allocation is the strategy.
4. Price Still Matters
This is where the conversation becomes uncomfortable.
If I told you a business was worth $1 million, would you be equally happy buying it for $700,000, $1 million, or $3 million?
Probably not.
Yet investors sometimes talk about the stock market as though the price paid is almost irrelevant as long as the holding period is sufficiently long.
I don’t think that makes sense.
Price matters.
But saying price matters is not the same thing as saying I know where prices are going next.
Those are completely different claims.
Valuation measures have historically shown relationships with subsequent long-term returns. Generally, higher starting valuations have been associated with lower long-term returns, while lower starting valuations have been associated with higher long-term returns.[2]
That does not mean an expensive market is about to fall. An expensive market can become more expensive. A cheap market can become cheaper.
And valuation has historically been far more useful as a way to think about long-term expectations than as a short-term market-timing signal.
Our research for this paper found the same tension. Starting valuation contained more information about longer-term return outcomes than about what happened next. But that relationship did not translate cleanly into a superior buy-or-wait rule.
That distinction matters. A variable can help shape expectations without telling an investor exactly when to buy, sell, or sit in cash.

Historical valuation measures have shown relationships with subsequent long-term returns, but that relationship has not provided a reliable short-term market-timing signal. See endnote 2.
If valuation suggests prospective returns may be lower than they were at cheaper prices, the answer does not automatically become sell everything or stop investing.
It may simply mean lowering return assumptions. It may change how opportunities are compared. It may affect how much risk an investor needs to take relative to available alternatives. Or it may mean continuing to buy the same diversified portfolio because the time horizon is long and the investment policy does not depend on forecasting market turns.
A decision to spread purchases over time requires its own justification. Phasing may make a large investment easier to live with, but a valuation chart does not establish that waiting will improve the result. When valuation causes us to delay otherwise-planned equity exposure, that decision has an opportunity cost and should be evaluated against a suitable policy that does not make the change.
Valuation should inform expectations. It should not become an excuse to predict crashes.
5. Patience Has a Cost
One of the most dangerous things an investor can say is:
“I’ll invest after the market drops.”
When?
Five percent? Ten? Twenty?
And what happens if the market rises 25% before it falls 15%? Do you buy then, or wait for another decline?
This is where valuation discipline can quietly turn into market timing, and market timing can turn into paralysis.
Research on investing an already-available lump sum has historically favored investing immediately more often than delaying deployment.[3] That does not mean immediate investment wins in every period, nor does it mean phased investing is irrational for an investor whose circumstances or behavior make a single deployment difficult.
The important point is simpler: waiting has an opportunity cost.
Valuation does not eliminate that tradeoff. An expensive market can remain expensive, and an investor waiting for a better entry price may never receive one. That is why I do not believe stocks look expensive, by itself, is a sufficient reason to stop investing.
So waiting has a cost.
But every allocation has an opportunity cost. An investor also has to ask whether the expected compensation for taking additional risk is necessary for the goal being funded.
That question becomes especially important after substantial wealth has already been accumulated.
The answer will not always be “take less risk.” A long time horizon, future spending needs, inflation, longevity, and legacy goals can all justify continued exposure to growth assets.
But the purpose of the money should determine how much risk is necessary—not the assumption that every dollar must pursue the highest possible return.
There is also an important distinction between two kinds of waiting.
Holding lower-risk assets because the money funds a known near-term obligation is a planning decision.
Holding lower-risk assets because you expect stocks to become cheaper later is an investment judgment.
Both can be reasonable. They should not be confused.
Waiting has a cost. So does taking risk that the financial plan does not require.
The goal is not to sit on the sidelines waiting for the perfect pitch. There may never be one. The goal is to have enough structure that patience does not become paralysis and enough flexibility that the portfolio still fits when circumstances change.
6. What Ten Years Can Actually Feel Like
“Stocks go up over the long run.”
Historically, that’s been a pretty good statement.
The problem is that people don’t experience the long run as an average.
They live through it one year at a time.
Consider an investor entering 2000.

Selected historical index illustration using a $100,000 starting value and Aswath Damodaran’s published S&P stock-return series, including dividends, from the beginning of 2000 through December 31, 2009. Purchasing power is expressed in December 1999 dollars using CPI-U, U.S. city average, all items, not seasonally adjusted. No fees, taxes, contributions, or withdrawals. This period was deliberately selected to illustrate a challenging historical outcome and is not representative of all investment periods. It is not the performance of 369 Financial or any client account. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Indexes are unmanaged and cannot be invested in directly. See endnote 4.
Using Professor Aswath Damodaran’s published S&P stock-return series, which includes dividends, a $100,000 starting value applied to this historical index-return series finished 2009 at approximately $90,863.[4]
After adjusting for inflation using CPI-U, its purchasing power was approximately $70,814 in beginning-period dollars.[4]
That’s not an argument that an investor standing in 1999 could have predicted what was coming.
They could not know it in advance.
And selecting this particular decade after the fact doesn’t prove that investors should wait whenever valuations are elevated.
It demonstrates something different:
Time horizon matters because real investors don’t experience averages. They experience sequences.
There is another period worth examining.

Selected historical index illustration using a $100,000 starting value and Aswath Damodaran’s published S&P stock-return series, including dividends, from the beginning of 1966 through December 31, 1982. Purchasing power is expressed in December 1965 dollars using CPI-U, U.S. city average, all items, not seasonally adjusted. No fees, taxes, contributions, or withdrawals. This period was deliberately selected to illustrate a challenging historical outcome and is not representative of all investment periods. It is not the performance of 369 Financial or any client account. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Indexes are unmanaged and cannot be invested in directly. See endnote 4.
Using the same historical index-return series, a $100,000 starting value at the beginning of 1966 grew to approximately $304,419 by the end of 1982.[4]
That sounds pretty good.
But inflation over the same period was enormous.
In beginning-period purchasing-power terms, the ending value was approximately $99,186.[4]
Seventeen years.
A much larger number on the statement.
Very little improvement in purchasing power.
Again, that does not mean stocks “didn’t work.”
It means nominal return and financial progress are not always the same thing.
And for someone withdrawing money, retiring, funding college, buying a house, or simply living through those years, the path can matter enormously.
7. Five Hundred Stocks Doesn’t Mean Five Hundred Equal Bets
The S&P 500 is diversified.
It also isn’t equally weighted.
That’s not a criticism. It’s how the index is designed.
As companies become more valuable, they become larger portions of the index.
That has an important advantage:
Winners are allowed to become winners.
An investor doesn’t have to predict which company will become dominant. Market capitalization adjusts the exposure automatically.
That’s powerful.
But it also means investors should understand what they actually own.

S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P 500 characteristics, as of August 31, 2026. The S&P 500 is float-adjusted market-cap weighted. Multiple share classes may appear separately. See endnote 5.
As of August 31, 2026, the ten largest constituent securities represented approximately 37.8% of the S&P 500. The largest constituent represented approximately 8.1%.[5]
That does not mean a crash is coming.
It doesn’t mean those companies are overvalued.
And it certainly doesn’t mean investors should avoid the index.
It simply means:
Diversification by number of securities is not necessarily the same thing as diversification of economic exposure.
Know what you own.
That rule applies whether you own five stocks or five hundred.
8. The Strongest Argument for Indexing
If I were trying to convince you not to pick individual stocks, one piece of research would be near the top of my list.
Research by Hendrik Bessembinder has documented an extraordinary feature of long-term stock-market wealth creation: a remarkably small number of firms have accounted for a huge portion of the market’s net wealth creation.
In his updated century-long U.S. research covering 1926 through 2025, 46 firms accounted for half of approximately $90.96 trillion in net shareholder wealth creation relative to one-month Treasury bills. Those 46 firms represented about 0.16% of the 29,081 firms in the study.[6]

Bessembinder measures shareholder wealth creation relative to a one-month Treasury-bill benchmark. The study distinguishes individual common stocks from firms; the 0.16% denominator is firms, not stock listings. See endnote 6.
Think about what that means.
Broad ownership reduces the investor’s dependence on identifying those future extreme winners in advance.
A concentrated investor who owns some of those exceptional winners early can outperform substantially. The same investor can also miss them entirely.
That’s not a footnote in the case for indexing.
It’s one of the strongest arguments for it.
And professional investors don’t make the alternative look easy either.

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Year-End 2025. Percentages show the share of All Large-Cap funds underperforming the S&P 500 for each stated horizon. This is a benchmark comparison, not a risk-adjusted skill test or a causal explanation for underperformance. See endnote 7.
SPIVA’s Year-End 2025 scorecard reported that 85.59% of All Large-Cap U.S. funds underperformed the S&P 500 over the preceding ten years.[7]
That does not prove active management is impossible.
It demonstrates the size of the hurdle.
And that distinction matters.
9. Skill Exists. Capturing It Is Hard.
One of the strangest arguments in investing is the idea that nobody can beat the market.
Of course someone can.
The more difficult question is whether the investor can identify genuine skill before the result is obvious, obtain access to it at a reasonable cost, stay invested through periods of underperformance, and continue benefiting after the manager or strategy attracts more capital.
Taxes, fees, capacity, behavior, and the persistence of the opportunity all matter.
That is why the academic literature is more nuanced than the popular debate sometimes suggests. Research has found evidence consistent with investment skill under certain definitions and methodologies while also documenting how difficult it can be for investors to capture positive net alpha reliably.[8]
Some research has gone further and reported success selecting funds prospectively using manager and fund characteristics. That matters. It means the evidence does not justify saying skilled managers can only be identified after the fact.[9]
But prospective statistical success is still not the same thing as a durable investor advantage. A method has to survive replication, changing market environments, fees, taxes, capacity, access, and real-world implementation. Investment research is also vulnerable to something as simple as accidentally allowing future information into a historical test. When the methodology changes, a result can change with it.[10]
Even John Bogle did not need to believe that successful active managers were impossible for the indexing argument to work. Buffett has similarly acknowledged that skilled investors exist while repeatedly emphasizing how difficult they are to identify in advance and how easily luck can resemble skill.[11]
That leads to a better conclusion than “active doesn’t work.”
Skill can exist without being easy to identify, access, or capture.
Indexing offers an elegant solution to that problem. It allows an investor to pursue market returns without making their financial future dependent on successfully identifying the next exceptional investor.
That’s a feature, not a weakness.
10. What Buffett’s Bet Actually Proved
Warren Buffett’s famous wager against hedge funds is often simplified into something it wasn’t.
The wager did not require the S&P 500 to beat the hedge funds every year for ten consecutive years.
It compared cumulative performance from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2017, net of fees, costs, and expenses. Protégé Partners selected five funds-of-hedge-funds. Buffett selected a low-cost S&P 500 index fund.
Buffett’s reported final scorecard showed the index fund gaining 125.8%, versus reported gains ranging from 2.8% to 87.7% for the five fund-of-funds selections. One selection, Fund D, liquidated during 2017; Buffett’s table reports its annualized result over nine years rather than an uninterrupted ten-year history.[12]
That’s a stark result for that particular implementation.
But what does it actually prove?
It shows that layers of expensive expertise do not guarantee better outcomes. It demonstrates how significantly fees and implementation can matter. And it reinforces how difficult manager selection can be.
It does not prove that no active investor can outperform. Buffett himself explicitly acknowledged skilled exceptions while discussing the broader lesson.
So the useful question isn’t:
Can anyone beat an index?
It is:
What evidence do I have that this particular departure from the index improves my odds after costs, taxes, risk, and behavior?
That’s a much higher standard.
It should be.
11. Own Businesses, Not Tickers
When I look at an individual stock, I try to separate two things investors constantly mix together: the business and the stock.
The stock is not the company, and the company is not the stock.
A company’s stock price can rise while the underlying business deteriorates because investors expect better things in the future. A business can improve while its stock goes nowhere because expectations had already been too high.
That distinction matters.
When evaluating a business, some of the first questions I want to understand are straightforward. What am I paying relative to earnings? Is the business actually profitable? How have the underlying economics changed over the last several years and quarters? How much cash does the company have? What does the balance sheet look like? What is management doing with the cash the business generates?
If the company is repurchasing shares, at what price?
Buybacks are not automatically good. A company that repurchases undervalued shares can increase each remaining shareholder’s ownership of the business. A company that aggressively repurchases overpriced stock can destroy value even while mechanically increasing earnings per share.[13]
Price matters there too.
This is also why I don’t believe the decision to sell should begin with “the stock went down.” If the facts supporting the original investment thesis remain intact, price volatility by itself does not necessarily change the thesis. Likewise, a rising stock price does not prove the thesis is correct.
My basic business-analysis rule is:
In individual-security analysis, a broken thesis can be a reason to sell. A materially better opportunity can be a reason to reallocate. Otherwise, let the business—not the ticker—drive the analysis.
But that is not an exhaustive household portfolio rule.
A sound business can still become an unsuitable position because it has grown too large relative to the investor’s wealth, because liquidity needs changed, because taxes or estate-planning considerations matter, because the valuation no longer offers an acceptable prospective return, or because the financial goal itself changed.
Conviction also does not mean refusing to admit you were wrong. If the facts supporting the original thesis are no longer true, the thesis has to be reconsidered.
Otherwise conviction can become rationalization.
12. Complexity Has to Earn Its Place
At this point, someone should challenge me.
Why do any of this?
Why shouldn’t a busy executive simply automate contributions into low-cost index funds, rebalance periodically, manage taxes, and spend their time becoming better at their career?
That’s a very good argument.
And for many people, that may be exactly what they should do.
If the strategy gives you a reasonable probability of reaching your goals on a timeline you’re comfortable with, why make it more complicated?
Complexity has to earn its place.
Late in his career, Benjamin Graham was skeptical that vague appeals to different investor requirements automatically justified departing from an index-like baseline. I think that’s a useful challenge even for people who believe in customized investment management.[14]
Personalization cannot become an excuse that automatically justifies additional activity, costs, or complexity. If we’re going to depart from a suitable low-cost alternative, we should be able to explain what problem we’re solving and why the additional decisions are worth making.
That’s a standard I think advisors should welcome.
The client doesn’t need to spend weekends reading 10-Qs for thoughtful investment work to matter.
They can delegate that work.
But delegation doesn’t remove the burden of proof.
Whether the decision involves an individual security, a concentrated portfolio, a tax strategy, or a different allocation, we should still be able to answer:
What specific problem does this solve that the simpler alternative does not?
Sometimes there will be a compelling answer.
Sometimes there won’t.
13. Every Dollar Has Alternatives
Capital allocation is always relative.
If I invest a dollar here, I cannot simultaneously invest the same dollar somewhere else.
That sounds obvious.
But it is surprisingly easy to forget.

Important: These figures are not directly comparable. Treasury par-curve rates are market-derived rates for defined maturities. The equity figure is a model-based 10-year forecast with uncertainty. Horizons, risks, reinvestment assumptions, fees, taxes, and inflation treatment differ. See endnote 15.
At various points in market history, investors have faced environments where relatively conservative U.S. Treasury securities offered meaningful yields while long-term equity-return forecasts were relatively modest.
These aren’t directly comparable numbers.
A Treasury security’s yield is grounded in observable market prices and defined cash flows; the Treasury’s published par-yield curve is a market-derived rate. A long-term equity-return forecast is a model estimate surrounded by uncertainty. The horizons, risks, and reinvestment assumptions are different.[15]
So the comparison should not be used to declare one asset better than the other.
It is useful because it forces a more basic question:
What am I being paid to take the additional risk?
And there is another question:
Do I need to take it?
Suppose someone has accumulated $5 million and needs roughly $150,000 annually to support their lifestyle.
The simple arithmetic says $5 million represents more than 33 years of $150,000 withdrawals before considering any return at all.
That is not a retirement plan.
Inflation matters.
Taxes matter.
Longevity matters.
Lifestyle creep matters.
Investment returns matter.
But the scale changes the conversation.
The investor may no longer need every dollar pursuing maximum growth.
Some capital might exist to fund near-term spending.
Some might provide liquidity and flexibility.
Some may be invested for long-term growth.
Some may eventually be used for family, philanthropy, a business, or opportunities we cannot predict today.
As wealth grows, the purpose of the money should matter more—not less.
The objective isn’t simply to make the number bigger forever.
Money is a tool.
And eventually that tool can buy something more valuable than another percentage point of return:
flexibility, freedom, and choice.
14. Taxes Can Change the Answer
There is another reason the same investment can be right for one investor and wrong for another.
Taxes.
Two portfolios with identical pretax returns can produce different amounts of spendable wealth.
An investor with significant embedded gains has a different decision than someone investing fresh cash.
An executive with concentrated employer stock has a different problem than someone whose wealth is already diversified.
A retiree drawing from taxable accounts, IRAs, and Roth accounts has different decisions than someone accumulating entirely inside a retirement plan.
ETFs can be tax-efficient.[16]
That’s another argument in their favor.
Direct ownership, however, can sometimes provide additional control over when gains and losses are realized.
Neither answer is automatically superior.
And the comparison matters.
A customized tax strategy should not get credit merely for beating a tax-oblivious portfolio. The better question is whether it improves the investor’s outcome relative to a suitable, low-cost alternative that already handles basic asset location, tax-efficient fund selection, and withdrawal decisions reasonably well.
Research has found potential benefits from strategies such as asset location and tax-loss harvesting. But the value can vary materially based on tax rates, account mix, the ability to use losses, future tax consequences, implementation costs, and what eventually happens to the assets.[17]
So the question is whether the additional customization creates enough value to justify:
- additional complexity,
- trading,
- tracking differences,
- concentration risk,
- taxes,
- costs,
- and the possibility of making a mistake.
Tax efficiency should serve the investment strategy.
The investment strategy should serve the financial plan.
15. The Case Against Everything I Just Told You
Now let’s try to destroy the argument.
Maybe you aren’t good at valuing businesses. Maybe your advisor isn’t either. Maybe what feels like patience is actually fear. Maybe “waiting for a better opportunity” turns into five years sitting in cash while markets compound. Maybe the stock you think is undervalued is cheap because the market understands something you don’t.
Maybe you confuse familiarity with knowledge. Maybe you keep adding to a losing investment because admitting you were wrong is painful. Maybe your supposedly customized portfolio is really an expensive index fund with fewer stocks. Maybe additional trading creates taxes and friction that overwhelm whatever advantage you thought you had.
Maybe the simple portfolio wins because the complicated portfolio gives you more opportunities to make mistakes.
Those aren’t theoretical objections. They’re real.
There is another risk too: finding a pattern in historical data that disappears when the methodology gets tighter.
Investment research can look persuasive because of the starting date, the benchmark, the assumptions, the sample, or even information that accidentally slipped into the test before it would actually have been known. A strategy should not earn our confidence simply because a backtest looks good.[10]
The research process for this paper reinforced that point. Some relationships remained useful after we pushed on them. Others became much weaker when we asked a harder question: Could an investor actually have implemented this decision with the information available at the time?
That is the standard that matters.
Individual-investor research has repeatedly shown the damage unnecessary trading can cause. Professional active managers have struggled to outperform suitable benchmarks over long periods. Some research reports prospective manager-selection success, but identifying a promising statistical result is still different from delivering a persistent, investable advantage after costs and implementation.[18]
And there’s another uncomfortable truth: if you’re going to be different from the benchmark, there can be periods when you look wrong. Maybe very wrong.
In December 1999, near the peak of the technology boom, Forbes published an article titled “Buffett: What Went Wrong?” Buffett looked out of step with a market rewarding businesses he largely avoided.[19]
But the useful lesson is not simply that Buffett endured criticism and was eventually vindicated. In Berkshire’s own 1999 shareholder letter, Buffett accepted responsibility for disappointing relative results and acknowledged operating problems at important holdings.[20]
That is the harder standard.
Sometimes the market is temporarily disagreeing with you. Sometimes the facts are telling you that your original assessment needs to change.
So the lesson isn’t:
Stick with your strategy no matter what.
The better lesson is:
Know what would prove your strategy wrong before the market makes that question emotionally difficult.
A good investment process needs conviction.
It also needs accountability and humility.
16. What Should My Next Dollar Do?
This brings us back to the question at the center of the paper.
Not:
What is the best investment?
There isn’t one universal answer.
Instead:
What should my next dollar do?
Before choosing the product, ask what the dollar needs to accomplish.

This framework is not a ranking of products and does not imply that more decisions are better than a simple, appropriate investment policy.
What is the goal?
When might I need the money?
How much liquidity do I need?
What do I already own?
What risks am I already taking elsewhere in my financial life?
What return do I actually need?
What price am I paying?
What alternatives are available?
What are the tax consequences?
And I would add two behavioral questions:
Am I making a strategic decision—or reacting to fear or FOMO?
Would I make the same decision if I didn’t know what the market did yesterday?
Only after answering those questions should we start arguing about products.
Maybe the answer is an S&P 500 ETF. Great.
Maybe it’s another diversified investment, an individual company you understand and believe is attractively priced, short-term Treasuries because the money has a near-term purpose, debt reduction, additional liquidity, or diversifying a concentrated position.
And sometimes the honest answer is:
I don’t know yet.
There is nothing wrong with uncertainty. But “I don’t know yet” should lead to a defined next step rather than becoming an indefinite veto on investing.
What remains unresolved? When will the decision be reviewed? What policy applies while uncertainty remains?
For money intended for long-term investment, uncertainty is normal. The goal is not to wait until uncertainty disappears. It never will.
The goal isn’t to make perfect decisions.
It’s to make intentional ones within a policy you can actually follow.
Conclusion: The Next Dollar
I don’t think investors need to choose a side in the active-versus-passive debate.
That debate is too small.
Indexing can work very well for solving a difficult problem: owning a broad collection of productive businesses at very low cost without needing to identify tomorrow’s winners.
That’s powerful.
Active investment skill can also exist. But identifying that skill in advance, accessing it, paying a reasonable price for it, and sticking with it long enough to benefit from it are entirely different problems.
Valuation matters, but valuation isn’t a crystal ball. Price matters, but price alone isn’t a thesis. Patience matters, but patience can become paralysis. Conviction matters, but conviction without a willingness to change your mind can become stubbornness. Diversification matters, but diversification does not tell you whether the investment fits your life. And customization can matter, but complexity has to earn its place.
That’s why I keep coming back to one simple question:
What should my next dollar do?
For a 30-year-old automatically investing every paycheck, the answer might be:
Right back into the index.
For an executive sitting on a concentrated stock position, it might be something completely different. For someone approaching retirement, it may be building the pool of capital needed over the next several years. For someone who has already accumulated enough wealth to fund everything they reasonably need, the question might not even be how to maximize return anymore.
It might be:
What does this money allow me to do?
That’s capital allocation.
And I believe it deserves more thought than simply asking which ticker to buy.
An ETF is a product. Capital allocation is the strategy.
Investing doesn’t need to be complicated.
But it should be intentional.
Endnotes & Methodology
The factual claims, statistics, and historical illustrations in this paper were checked against primary or institutional sources where available. Historical illustrations are provided for context and are not forecasts, guarantees of future results, or client performance.
[1] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, “Updated Investor Bulletin: Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs),” February 23, 2023; S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Year-End 2025, 2026. ETF characteristics vary by fund; indexing and ETF structure are related but not synonymous.
[2] Robert J. Shiller, stock-market data used in Irrational Exuberance; John Y. Campbell and Samuel B. Thompson, “Predicting Excess Stock Returns Out of Sample: Can Anything Beat the Historical Average?”, Review of Financial Studies 21(4), 2008; Amit Goyal, Ivo Welch, and Athan Zafirov, “A Comprehensive 2022 Look at the Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction,”, Review of Financial Studies 37(11), 2024. The literature supports caution: valuation can contain information about expected returns without providing a reliable short-term market-timing rule.
[3] Vanguard, Cost averaging: Invest now or temporarily hold your cash?, 2023. Vanguard’s historical comparison used MSCI World data from 1976–2022 and found immediate investment ahead roughly two-thirds of the time; the study distinguishes an already-available lump sum from recurring contributions as money is earned.
[4] Aswath Damodaran, NYU Stern, Historical Returns on Stocks, Bonds and Bills: 1928–2025, updated January 5, 2026; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical CPI-U, U.S. city average, all items, not seasonally adjusted. Illustrations assume $100,000 invested at the beginning of the starting year and valued at year-end, dividends included, no contributions, withdrawals, fees, or investor taxes. Inflation uses December CPI-U. For 2000–2009, published cumulative stock values of 156,658.05 and 142,344.87 and CPI values of 168.3 and 215.949 produce approximately $90,863 nominal and $70,814 in beginning-period purchasing power. For 1966–1982, cumulative values of 2,990.97 and 9,105.08 and CPI values of 31.8 and 97.6 produce approximately $304,419 nominal and $99,186 real.
[5] S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P 500 index characteristics, as of August 31, 2026. The publisher reported 503 constituent securities, a 37.8% weight for the ten largest constituent securities, and an 8.1% weight for the largest constituent. Because multiple share classes can appear separately, “securities” is more precise here than “companies.”
[6] Hendrik Bessembinder, “One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets,” March 2026. The study covers 29,754 common stocks associated with 29,081 firms over 1926–2025 and reports approximately $90.96 trillion in net shareholder wealth creation relative to one-month Treasury bills; 46 firms account for half of that total. The 46-firm figure is approximately 0.16% of the 29,081 firms.
[7] S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Year-End 2025. As of December 31, 2025, 85.59% of All Large-Cap funds underperformed the S&P 500 over the preceding ten years. SPIVA is a benchmark comparison, not a causal explanation for underperformance and not a risk-adjusted manager-skill test.
[8] Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns,” Journal of Finance 65(5), 2010; Jonathan Berk and Richard Green, “Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets,” NBER Working Paper 9275 / Journal of Political Economy, 2004; Jonathan Berk and Jules van Binsbergen, “Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry,” Journal of Financial Economics, 2015; William F. Sharpe, “The Arithmetic of Active Management,” 1991. These papers use different definitions of skill and investor benefit; they should not be treated as a single unanimous result.
[9] Ron Kaniel, Zihan Lin, Markus Pelger, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, “Machine-learning the skill of mutual fund managers,” Journal of Financial Economics 150(1), 2023. The authors report out-of-sample differentiation between higher- and lower-performing funds using fund characteristics. This is affirmative prospective-selection evidence, not proof that every investor can implement the method or that the result will persist indefinitely.
[10] Victor DeMiguel, Javier Gil-Bazo, Francisco J. Nogales, and André A. P. Santos, replication files and correction notice, version 5, September 11, 2026, relating to their 2023 Journal of Financial Economics paper on machine-learning fund selection. The correction illustrates why look-ahead bias and implementation timing require scrutiny. It should not be attributed to the separate Kaniel et al. study in endnote 9.
[11] John C. Bogle, 2001 speech discussing active management and indexing, in which he explicitly accepts that some managers can outperform while emphasizing the arithmetic and cost hurdle; Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway 2016 shareholder letter, which acknowledges a small number of investors with exceptional long-term records while stressing the difficulty of identifying skill, distinguishing it from luck, and scaling it.
[12] Long Bets, Prediction 362: Buffett versus Protégé Partners, wager period January 1, 2008–December 31, 2017; Berkshire Hathaway, 2017 shareholder letter. Buffett’s final table reports a 125.8% cumulative gain for the S&P 500 index fund and 2.8%–87.7% cumulative gains for the five fund-of-funds selections. Fund D liquidated during 2017, so its reported annualized result covers nine years.
[13] Berkshire Hathaway, 2011 shareholder letter, “Share Repurchases.” Buffett argues that continuing shareholders benefit from repurchases below intrinsic value and can be hurt when shares are repurchased above intrinsic value. This is a capital-allocation principle, not a claim that intrinsic value can be estimated with certainty.
[14] Benjamin Graham interview in Irving Kahn and Robert D. Milne, Benjamin Graham, The Father of Financial Analysis, Research Foundation, 1977, pp. 39–40. Graham proposed beginning institutional management from an index-like baseline with accountability for deviations and expressed skepticism that broad claims about different investor requirements automatically justified departure. The interview does not establish that all households have identical goals, taxes, liabilities, or risk capacities.
[15] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Par Yield Curve Rates, September 11, 2026: 3-month 4.07%, 6-month 4.12%, 1-year 4.35%, 2-year 4.63%, 10-year 4.96%; Vanguard, Vanguard Capital Markets Model forecasts, published July 22, 2026, based on a June 30, 2026 model run: U.S. equity 10-year expected annualized nominal return range 4.2%–6.2%. These are intentionally not presented as equivalent measures. Treasury par-curve rates are market-derived; the Vanguard figure is a modeled long-horizon forecast.
[16] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Updated Investor Bulletin: Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs),” February 23, 2023. Many ETFs can reduce capital-gain distributions through in-kind creation and redemption mechanisms, but tax efficiency varies by fund and is irrelevant to capital-gain distributions inside tax-advantaged accounts.
[17] Vanguard, Revisiting the conventional wisdom regarding asset location, 2022; Shomesh Chaudhuri, Terence Burnham, and Andrew W. Lo, “An Empirical Evaluation of Tax-Loss-Harvesting Alpha,” Financial Analysts Journal 76(3), 2020. Both analyses are assumption-dependent. The Vanguard asset-location benefit is relative to its modeled comparator; the tax-loss-harvesting study reports simulated before-transaction-cost benefits under specified tax assumptions. Neither is a guaranteed household outcome.
[18] Brad Barber and Terrance Odean, “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth,” Journal of Finance 55(2), 2000; S&P Dow Jones Indices, SPIVA U.S. Year-End 2025; Kaniel et al., endnote 9. Barber and Odean studied 66,465 brokerage households from 1991–1996, so its transaction-cost environment should not be mechanically transferred to today’s market.
[19] Martin Sosnoff, “Buffett: What Went Wrong?”, Forbes, December 13, 1999. The citation establishes the contemporary criticism; the article’s judgments are not adopted as factual conclusions.
[20] Berkshire Hathaway, 1999 shareholder letter. Buffett described 1999 as Berkshire’s worst relative performance of his tenure to that point, assigned himself responsibility for the equity portfolio, and noted disappointing operating results at several major investees.
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